FBI Disrupts FaceStealer: How North Korea's Fake Video Calls Steal Crypto
DOJ and the FBI say North Korea's FaceStealer campaign used hijacked accounts, fake video meetings and a bogus audio fix to steal more than $400 million in crypto. Here is how it works and how to protect yourself.
Crypto Support & Research Desk
Quick answer: On November 12, 2026, the U.S. Justice Department and FBI announced they had disrupted "FaceStealer", a North Korean campaign that uses fake video meetings and prerecorded or deepfake video to trick crypto holders into installing malware. Officials say it has stolen more than $400 million in 18 months. Never install a "fix" offered during a call.
What happened
On Thursday, November 12, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice published a press release titled "Justice Department Announces Actions to Disrupt North Korea's Massive Theft of Cryptocurrency". In it, DOJ described a social engineering campaign the FBI calls FaceStealer and said the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California had disrupted and seized cloud-based infrastructure used to run it.
According to DOJ, FaceStealer "has resulted in the theft of more than $400 million" over the last 18 months. Under a federal warrant, the FBI also seized more than 900 webcam videos of victims that the attackers had recorded and were reusing to deceive new targets. The FBI published a report through its Internet Crime Complaint Center and created a dedicated public page at fbi.gov/facestealer.
DOJ attributes the activity to North Korean state-linked operators tracked by security companies under names including Sapphire Sleet, UNC1069, BlueNoroff, APT38, CryptoCore, Dangerous Password and Stardust Chollima. The same release also gave an update on the separate late-October Binance theft, which DOJ attributes to a different North Korean group it calls TraderTraitor. If you hold funds on Binance, our guide to checking your assets during the phased restoration covers that case.
How the FaceStealer attack works
The campaign does not rely on a broken smart contract or an exchange bug. It targets people. DOJ's description, together with secondary reporting from security outlets, outlines a repeatable pattern.
Step 1: A trusted contact invites you to a meeting
The invitation comes from an account that the attackers already stole from a previous victim. Because it is a real account belonging to someone you may know, such as a founder, investor, recruiter or colleague, the request does not look suspicious. Security news site GBHackers reports that messaging platforms such as Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack and Discord have been used, and that scheduling links and look-alike Zoom or Teams addresses may arrive shortly before the call. DOJ itself does not name specific platforms.
Step 2: The "person" on video is a recording or a deepfake
Once you join, the attackers play prerecorded video of earlier victims, and sometimes deepfakes of well-known crypto figures, so it appears you are speaking with your contact. At the same time, they record your webcam. That footage can later be replayed to fool people who know you, which is how the seized archive of more than 900 videos was built.
Step 3: A fake technical problem and a "fix"
The attacker says your audio is not working and offers a fix, such as a link, an "update" or a prompt. DOJ says this fix "surreptitiously installs malware." GBHackers adds that the fix can be a command the victim is asked to paste into a terminal, and that the malware can harvest browser cookies, log keystrokes, capture the screen and open a backdoor. Those malware details come from secondary reporting, not the DOJ text.
Step 4: A patient theft
DOJ notes that funds were often stolen "several months to more than a year" after the initial compromise. In the meantime, hijacked accounts are used to approach the victim's own contacts, which keeps the cycle going.
Who is affected
Anyone who holds crypto and takes video calls with people in the industry is a potential target. DOJ also says the group increasingly targets open-source software maintainers, apparently to gain access to widely used code packages. That creates supply-chain risk for wallet and exchange users even if they never take a suspicious call themselves.
Exchange customers are affected indirectly. When large thefts happen, platforms may pause withdrawals or freeze suspicious transfers. In South Korea, for example, regulators now let exchanges freeze withdrawals pre-emptively when hacking is suspected.
How to check whether you were targeted
Use this checklist if you have taken unexpected video calls in the past year, especially calls where audio "failed".
- Review your call history. Look for meetings that came from a contact's account but felt rushed, used an unfamiliar meeting link, or included a request to install or run something.
- Check the meeting domain. Real Zoom links use zoom.us and real Teams links use teams.microsoft.com or teams.live.com. A slightly misspelled domain is a red flag.
- Ask the contact directly. Message or call them on a different channel and ask whether they actually invited you.
- Look at your terminal history and installed apps. On macOS or Linux, review recent shell history for commands you do not recognize. On any system, look for apps or browser extensions installed around the date of the call.
- Review active sessions. On exchanges, email, Telegram, Discord and LinkedIn, check "active sessions" or "devices" and log out anything you do not recognize.
- Read the official guidance. The FBI's FaceStealer page and IC3 report are the primary sources for indicators. Rely on them rather than social media summaries.
What to do if you think you were compromised
If you ran a command, installed software or clicked a "fix" during a suspicious call, assume the device is compromised.
Secure funds from a clean device
- Use a different, clean device (ideally one that has never run the suspicious software) to create a brand-new wallet with a new recovery phrase.
- Move funds from the exposed wallet to the new one. Do not reuse the old recovery phrase; the malware may have captured it.
- For hardware wallet users: the device protects keys, but verify every address on the hardware screen. Malware can swap addresses on your computer.
- Revoke unneeded token approvals from the clean device.
Lock down accounts
- Change passwords for email, exchanges and messaging apps from the clean device.
- Turn on app-based or hardware-key two-factor authentication and remove SMS where possible.
- Log out all other sessions. Stolen browser cookies can bypass passwords until sessions are ended.
- Warn your contacts that your account may have been used to send meeting invites.
Report it
Report the incident to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov and keep records: meeting links, account names, timestamps and any wallet addresses involved. If an exchange account is involved, contact the exchange only through its official app or website.
Why this matters for the wider market
FaceStealer is one part of a broader pattern of North Korean activity aimed at the crypto industry, from fake job offers to direct attacks on exchanges. The size of the reported losses, more than $400 million attributed to this one campaign, shows that social engineering now rivals smart contract exploits as a source of theft. Security incidents at wallet providers, such as the Blink Wallet pause earlier this year, show how quickly user trust can be hit when attackers gain access.
For readers, the practical lesson is simple: verify people and links out-of-band, separate the device that holds your keys from the device you use for calls, and never install anything at a stranger's request, even if the stranger has a familiar face.
Frequently asked questions
What is FaceStealer?
FaceStealer is the FBI's name for a North Korean social engineering campaign that lures crypto holders into fake video meetings, uses prerecorded or deepfake video to appear trustworthy, and tricks victims into installing malware. DOJ says it has caused more than $400 million in losses over 18 months.
What did the FBI and DOJ do on November 12, 2026?
DOJ announced that the FBI disrupted and seized cloud infrastructure used in the campaign, seized more than 900 webcam videos of victims under a federal warrant, published an IC3 report and launched a public information page at fbi.gov/facestealer.
How can I tell if a meeting invite is part of FaceStealer?
Warning signs include an unexpected invite from a known account, a meeting link on an unfamiliar domain, a contact whose video seems looped or unnatural, and a claim that your audio is broken followed by a request to install or run something. Confirm the invite with the person through a separate channel.
I ran a command during a suspicious call. What should I do first?
Stop using that device for crypto. From a clean device, create a new wallet with a new recovery phrase, move your funds, change passwords, log out all sessions, enable app-based 2FA and report the incident at ic3.gov.
Will the FBI or an exchange ask for my recovery phrase to help recover funds?
No. Neither law enforcement nor a legitimate exchange will ever ask for your recovery phrase, private key, password or 2FA code. Treat any such request as a scam.
Conclusion
The DOJ and FBI action removes some of FaceStealer's infrastructure, but the technique, hijacked accounts plus convincing video, is easy to copy. Treat every unexpected meeting request with caution, verify contacts independently, never run a "fix" during a call, and keep your keys on a device that never joins video meetings. If anything about a past call worries you, move funds to a fresh wallet from a clean device now.
This article is for general information only and is not financial, legal or security advice. Coin Crypto 24 is an independent publication and is not affiliated with any exchange, wallet provider or government agency. We will never ask for your recovery phrase, private keys, passwords or 2FA codes.
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About the Author
Crypto Support & Research Desk
Crypto Support Desk publishes practical, source-led guides to exchange, wallet, network and on-chain service changes. Information is checked against primary or reputable security sources and is not investment advice.